Legal Action taken re. cyber-attack

 

Legal action is being taken against the directors of Hygiene Solutions Ltd in connection with flagrant breaches of the Computer Misuse Act 1990. See:

https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/18/crossheading/computer-misuse-offences

The relevant sections of the Act are summarized below:

Computer misuse offences

1 Unauthorised access to computer material.
(1)A person is guilty of an offence if—
(a) he causes a computer to perform any function with intent to secure access to any program or data held in any computer, or to enable any such access to be secured ;
(b) the access he intends to secure, or to enable to be secured, is unauthorised; and
(c) he knows at the time when he causes the computer to perform the function that that is the case.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—
(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both;

daltons

 In the recent illegal cyber-attack, a number of LinkedIn articles were deleted. These will be republished from backup data over the next few weeks. Opportunity will be taken to update the articles as necessary. A link to the first of these articles is included below.

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/freedom-information-request-reveals-exact-c-richard-marsh/Deprox

As a number of deproxfraud.info readers have pointed out, some videos were also lost from the site as a result of the associated Vimeo and Youtube channels being hacked and deleted. These have now been restored, and are reproduced below:

TOM LISTER

Video Deprox

 

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Shocking Ultra-V test results!

A comprehensive trial of the Hygiene Solutions Ltd Ultra-V decontamination system has exposed shocking discrepancies between the manufacturer’s claims and the actual performance of the system. Prof Peter Wilson, a consultant microbiologist at University College London Hospitals NHS Foundation (UCLH) tested the system against a variety of bacteria and spores using both contact plates and Biological Indicator discs. Six single patient isolation rooms were decontaminated and the results aggregated. The thorough in-vivo testing and the high reputation of the author and the UCLH Environmental Microbiology laboratory leave no doubt whatever as to the accuracy of the results.

Here are Hygiene Solutions’ claims, and the UCLH test results compared:

Claim:

Can achieve between a 6-log and a 4-log reduction of a broad spectrum of pathogens

Inactivates Clostridium difficile infection (C.diff.), Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and Vancomycin-resistant Enterococci (VRE) even in light soiling

Test Result

C. difficile spores in low soiling, log reductions between log 0.1 and log 1.1 (see Table III below)

Claim:

Placed in one central location within each room, Ultra-V can effectively decontaminate all surfaces in the enclosed healthcare area within the shortest treatment time.

Test Method

“Hygiene Solutions Ultra-V™: a single-emitter device (UVC, λ=265nm) relocated intermittently as determined by sensors in room.”

Claim:

How long does the process take? Average side room would normally take 20 minutes to complete.

Test Result

Process time, NOT including preliminary manual clean, 1 hour and 19 minutes. (See table 1 below)

Summary:

Hygiene Solutions claims imply a validated log 4 to 6 reduction of C. difficile, even in light soiling, on all surfaces in a single patient room in about 20 minutes – without moving the unit from a central location.

In reality, even with a 79 minute process time, and multiple relocations of the unit to eliminate shadowed areas, the greatest log reduction achieved for C.difficile spores was log 1.1. That is about ONE THOUSANDTH of the claimed performance – in spite of the process time being extended 4 fold.

Table 1

Table III

Download the entire paper as a pdf:

Comparison of Two Whole-Room UV-Irradiation Systems for Enhanced Disinfection of Patient Rooms Contaminated with MRSA, carbapenemase-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae and Clostridium difficile spores

S. Ali, S. Yui, M. Muzslay, A.P.R. Wilson

Or read the article on the Journal of Hospital Infection site:

http://www.journalofhospitalinfection.com/article/S0195-6701(17)30455-3/fulltext

Fentiman’s Toxic Legacy

After two years of misinformation, deceit and outright lies, fake “Cambridge graduate microbiologist” Rick Fentiman has to admit that his Deprox process leaves hospital rooms and equipment contaminated with highly toxic silver nitrate dust. A recent investigation at the University College London NHS Trust revealed the following figures:

  • Silver Nitrate content of Deproxin solution: 10 – 25mg/l
  • Silver Nitrate deposited on room surfaces after a single cycle: 1.5 – 2.5mg/m2

An independent test of the same parameters by Butterworth gave similar results:

  • (Deproxin) Silver expressed as Ag (by Plasma Emission Spectroscopy) 51.0mg/l
  • (Deproxin) Nitrate expressed as NO(by ion chromatography)  35.1mg/l

Surface deposits after single cycle:

  • (Surface) Silver expressed as Ag (by Plasma Emission Spectroscopy) 2.5mg/m2
  • (Surface) Nitrate expressed as NO(by ion chromatography) 1.8mg/m2

Silver nitrate is persistent in the environment, and will build up cumulatively each time a room is processed. The permitted level of silver nitrate dust in the air is vanishingly small. The legal maximum is 0.01mg/m³ –  250 times this amount of the chemical is deposited on each square metre of surface per process! 

This presents a particular danger to hospital staff making up the bed after a Deprox process – laying down the mattress and placing sheets will disturb clouds of the fine dust at very hazardous levels. Staff should certainly be provided with appropriate respiratory equipment for this task, and silver nitrate dust levels should be monitored before readmitting patients. 

Rooms that have become heavily contaminated by multiple processes may need decontaminating by Hazchem professionals.

Silver Nitrate deposits at the Royal Liverpool Hospital

capture

Isolation rooms at the Royal Liverpool University Hospital have become so heavily contaminated with silver nitrate that patients have complained, mistaking the black deposits on the windows for dirt. Director of nursing Lisa Grant admitted that the Hydrogen Peroxide Vapour (HPV) bio-decontamination system leaves a “sterile residue” but was apparently unaware that it is silver nitrate. The photo above was submitted to The Liverpool Echo by a patient who attempted to remove the chemical with a tissue. There is enough silver nitrate on the tissue to cause unpleasant chemical burns to the skin. Even more seriously, the AgNO3 dust levels in the room must have been far in excess of the legal maximum, which is an invisibly small 0.01mg/m³ – that’s 1/100,000th of a gram per cubic metre of air.

Rick Fentiman

Rick Fentiman claims to be a "Cambridge graduate microbiologist"

Fentiman’s UCLH Hoax

 

A letter published this week by Prof. Wilson of UCLH finally proves how Hygiene Solutions’ (Deprox) director Rick Fentiman cheated both the UCLH and rival HPV system manufacturer Bioquell Plc, in a widely publicized comparative test in 2015. The results of this test apparently demonstrated that the Deprox, vapourising a 5% Hydrogen peroxide solution had identical germicidal efficacy as the Bioquell system vapourising 35% hydrogen peroxide solution.

I published an article in 2016 in which I analyzed the test results as published by Professor Wilson and colleagues in the Journal of Hospital Infection, and concluded that Fentiman had in fact filled the internal tank of the Deprox machine with a 35% solution prior to the test. New data published in the letter proves this claim beyond reasonable doubt.

In Wilson’s original test, neither the aerial concentration of H2O2 vapour , or the concentration of the liquid solutions was  measured.

In response to widespread concern and comment as to the rather surprising results obtained, Wilson recently again obtained the use of a Bioquell and a Deprox system and measured the concentrations of both the liquid and aerial vapour phases throughout their test cycles, as detailed in this week’s letter.

The Deprox was using 5% H2O2 solution, and produced peak vapour concentrations of 29 to 46ppm. The Bioquell machine was using a 35% solution, and produced 450 to 640ppm of vapour.

The maximum aerial concentration of H2O2 that can be generated is limited by the concentration of the original solution. Henry’s law can be used to prove that about 50ppm is the maximum sustained aerial concentration that can be generated from a 5% solution. The figure of 46ppm for Deprox from Wilson’s retest of the machine is thus exactly what would be expected.

In the original comparative test, both the Deprox and the Bioquell systems demonstrated practically identical efficacies of log 5.1 for spores and log 6.3 for vegetative bacteria. A very large number of biological indicators of several species were used over multiple tests, and no significant difference in performance between the two systems was found.

Therefore, inescapably, both systems must have generated the same aerial concentration of H2O2 vapour, and that must have been in the region of 400 to 700ppm. (There are numerous published papers demonstrating a log 6 efficacy for HPV systems using 30-35% H2O2 solutions)

It is physically impossible to generate anything close to these levels of vapour by evaporating or aerosolizing a 5% solution. Quite apart from Henry’s law, the volume of water that would have to be evaporated along with the H2O2 would quickly push the relative humidity to saturation, and prevent further evaporation from taking place.

Therefore, in the original comparative tests as published in the Journal of Hospital Infection, the Deprox was NOT running on a 5% H2O2 solution as claimed, but on a 35% solution, the same as the Bioquell system.

How then was this deception accomplished?

There are some aspects of the way in which the original UCLH tests were conducted that  are very suggestive:

At the time of the tests, Hygiene Solutions had a contract with UCLH, and had 4 Deprox machines permanently on site, which were operated daily by Hygiene Solutions employees. UCLH had a definite rule that the equipment was not to be operated by their staff – hence no UCLH staff were trained in the use of the equipment.

The paper states:  “The HPS1 unit was operated by a trained engineer (Bioquell), while the HPS2 module was operated by hospital staff following training by a dedicated member of the issuing manufacturer (i.e. Hygiene Solutions).”

I have two independent witnesses that the two Deprox machines were used in the trial were not the machines already on site, but were specially prepared at the Kings Lynn depot, with all new piezo discs and calatytic deactivation media. The machines were driven up to UCLH personally by Rick Fentiman, who stayed for the duration of the tests then drove the machines back to Lynn. Apparently no other Hygiene Solutions staff were involved. The “dedicated member” therefore was Rick Fentiman, and he instructed and supervised some unidentified member of the “hospital staff” in the operation of the equipment “on the spot”.

The paper says: “However, during this study, both parties provided storage of equipment and hydrogen peroxide stock solutions off-site.” In the case of the Deprox units, this was  the large van in which they were transported. Clearly then there would have been opportunity for Mr Fentiman to have filled the internal storage tank of the test machines with a 35% solution and disposed of or diluted any residual fluid after the test, without either his own employees or the UCLH staff being aware of the substitution.

It is pertinent that (unknown to the UCLH) the Deprox has a substantial internal storage tank, of about 8 litres capacity.

capo2

Illustration from the Deprox patent.

The evaporation unit draws from the bottom of this tank, and the 2 litre Deproxin refill bottles trickle feed in to the top of the tank. I assume that for the sake of authenticity, a genuine Deproxin refill was inserted in to the top of the machine for the tests, hence even if Prof Wilson had tested the concentration of the fluid, he would have found it to be as stated. As concentrated H2O2 solution is substantially denser than water, a trickle of dilute solution in to the top of the tank would have no significant effect over the course of a few cycles of the machine.

TOM LISTER

Deprox salesman Tom Lister stalls when faced with a direct question about the UCLH tests. The machines had been filled with a 35% hydrogen peroxide solution, where UCLH were told it was a 5% solution. Tom knows this, and his guilty conscience shows very clearly in his body language and facial expressions. Rather than answer he says “Where did you say you were from?” although I had just told him, and was wearing a badge with the answer in large type!

 

Wilson exposes Deprox fraud!

Deprox Hygiene Solutions

In a letter published today in the Journal of Hospital Infection, Professor Peter Wilson and colleagues report on their retesting of the Deprox (Hygiene Solutions Ltd) HPV decontamination system. The retesting was in response to concerns widely raised that the earlier tests of the system, which purported to give a log 6 efficacy, were the result of the manufacturer misrepresenting the concentration and/or constituents of the Deproxin solution.

In brief, the retest reveals the following:

  • The efficacy of the system, when using the correct 5% H2O2 solution, is around log 4 – similar to other, much less expensive fogging systems on the market. Hygiene Solutions Ltd will now be taxed to explain why on the initial test by Prof. Wilson, a log 6 efficacy was found. This 100 fold drop in efficacy comes between the first test series, in which the solution concentration was not checked, and the second series in which the concentration was independently measured. It seems highly likely that in the initial test series, the Deprox was running on a 30% H2O2 solution, rather than a 5% H2O2 solution as claimed.
  • The aerial H2O2 concentration on re-entering the room at the end of the cycle was 3.3ppm which is in excess of both short term and long term H2O2 exposure health limits. This is in spite of a hasty retrofit of catalysts to the whole Deprox fleet, and the manufacturer’s claim that their system monitored the H2O2 levels, and would only allow re-entry when the level was below the 1ppm safety standard.
  • Deproxin is confirmed to contain 10-20ppm silver nitrate, and this is indeed deposited on surfaces in the room, and may well be a contributor to the efficacy achieved. Hygiene Solutions informed the HSE over a year ago that Deproxin does not contain silver nitrate. This has now been exposed as untrue – and raises the question as to whether it is currently legal to sell or use the Deprox system.
  • Poor efficacy results for two more sheltered locations is attributed to inhomogeneous vapour distribution, due to inadequate circulation of the vapour. This raises serious doubts as to Hygiene Solutions’ claims that the Deprox will decontaminate “inside small crevices and complex equipment”

It is very much to the credit of Professor Wilson and colleagues that they have thoroughly retested the system in response to widespread concerns. It is sad that commercial interests would abuse the trust and confidence of highly qualified academics in this way by misrepresenting the basic test parameters.

For those without access to the Journal of Hospital Infection, I have reproduced the letter below, and a PDF is downloadable here.


Sir,

In response to the letter from Dr Singh commenting on our paper.[1], [2]

The objective of our study was to evaluate the reductions in environmental contamination during in-use operation of two commercially-available hydrogen peroxide whole-room disinfection systems.2 Both manufacturers agreed test parameters prior to the trial to ensure methodology followed manufacturer instructions. Our findings suggested similar efficacy of the two systems against both surface contamination and biological indicators of common pathogens. Inocula used on the indicators far exceeded the likely levels seen in the environment.

Additional studies were performed as part of the original work using the same methodology with four strains each of MRSA, Klebsiella pneumoniae, Clostridium difficile spores and Acinetobacter baumannii. Three HPV decontamination cycles were evaluated for each system. Of 305/320 samples, >4-log10 reduction was achieved.

Aerial concentrations of hydrogen peroxide and relative humidity were monitored continuously during a further 6 cycles of both systems using a sensor (C-16 Portasens II Gas Detector; Analytical Technology Inc., Collegeville, PA, USA). In addition, horizontal surfaces in the near-patient vicinity were swabbed and analysed to detect fallout of silver and nitrate at the end of HPV decontamination cycles (n=3). Surfaces were swabbed and analysed for silver by titration (Silver Test Kit, DTK Water, Wellingborough, UK) and nitrate using Quantofix semi-quantitative test strips (Macherey-Nagel, Düren, Germany).

For the Deprox (Hygiene Solutions, King’s Lynn, UK) system, peak aerial values of 29-46 ppm hydrogen peroxide were achieved with similar bacteriological efficacy as other cycles. The mean level at the end of the cycles was 3.3ppm for 41.8% (30.8-58.1%) mean relative humidity at start of cycles. Silver and nitrate were detected on surfaces at 1.5-2.5mg/m2 following cycles with the Deprox system.

For the Bioquell Q10 system with the R10 aeration unit (Bioquell, Andover, UK), the peak aerial levels of hydrogen peroxide were 450-640ppm. The mean level at the end of the cycles was 0.0ppm with starting mean relative humidity 42.5% (34.5-49.7%). No silver or nitrate was detected on surfaces following cycles with the Bioquell Q10 system.

The aqueous concentration of hydrogen peroxide in a Hygiene Solutions cartridge (Deprox) tested on one occasion at the point of insertion into the machine was 5%. Nitrate was detected in the aqueous solution at 10-25mg/L. The aqueous hydrogen peroxide concentration in the Bioquell Q10 cartridge (Bioquell HPV-AQ) was 35% and no silver or nitrate was detected.

Dr Singh suggests C. difficile spores (but not the other organisms) persisted underneath the bed and on the window frame after decontamination using the Deprox system. The persistence of spores may have been minimised during the Bioquell Q10 cycles by the inclusion of an oscillating fan to facilitate aerial distribution and aid breakdown of hydrogen peroxide vapour.

As Dr Singh suggests, settling of active silver onto biological indicator coupons during a cycle of aerial HPV decontamination may have contributed to the bactericidal/sporicidal activity of the Deprox system. However further studies would be required to elucidate its role.

“They deserve answers” – Theresa May.

rick fentiman

“We have evidence that warnings were ignored and that these products continued to be used despite the warnings and that following the infections…[there was] a cover-up,”  – Andy Evans, chairman of campaign group Tainted Blood

Speaking to the BBC, Mrs May said: “They deserve answers, and the inquiry that I have announced today will give them those answers, so they will know why this happened, how it happened”

These quotations from today’s news refer not to the Deprox, but to the tragic suffering and loss of life from infected blood administered by the NHS in the 70s and 80s. At last, there is to be an inquiry, and the victims’ relatives will know how and why 2,400 NHS patients died.

Meanwhile a disturbingly similar tragedy is unfolding right here and now – and again the NHS turns a blind eye for fear of negligence lawsuits, and the corrupt medical suppliers hastily reap the profits before the mounting evidence of fraud and corruption forces them back to the dark places that spawned them.

The victims – the frail elderly, the cancer patients, the cystic fibrosis sufferers, have no idea that the C. difficile or MRSA infections they have suffered from were preventable. They are assured that the hospital rooms and equipment have been sterilised by the best technology available – the Deprox – which according to the Hygiene Solutions Ltd. website, “…achieves a log 6 reduction of even the most virulent of organisms.”

The truth is in stark contrast to this glib fabrication; – leaked emails and the testimony of former Hygiene Solutions employees prove that the Deprox units are turned up to their maximum output of  RH30 when tested, but in everyday use are turned down to output levels of RH 5 to RH 15 – with directly proportional reductions in H2O2 concentration and germicidal efficacy.

To compound this error, a recent letter published in the Journal of Hospital Infection revealed that most of the tested efficacy of the Deprox process could be attributed to the exceptionally high silver nitrate content of the Deproxin solution – an illegal additive which Hygiene Solutions now claims to have removed.

What residual efficacy remains absent this powerful cytotoxin remains untested and unproven.

The shocking and highly persuasive statistics from the UCLH hospitals, showing a substantial upwards step change in C. difficile rates corresponding exactly with the years of Deprox use, cannot be denied. These are public data sets, and the 75 or so extra infections over this period demand explanation.

We need an inquiry in to the Deprox scandal NOW, while lives can still be saved – not in 30 years time.