Legal Action taken re. cyber-attack

 

Legal action is being taken against the directors of Hygiene Solutions Ltd in connection with flagrant breaches of the Computer Misuse Act 1990. See:

https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/18/crossheading/computer-misuse-offences

The relevant sections of the Act are summarized below:

Computer misuse offences

1 Unauthorised access to computer material.
(1)A person is guilty of an offence if—
(a) he causes a computer to perform any function with intent to secure access to any program or data held in any computer, or to enable any such access to be secured ;
(b) the access he intends to secure, or to enable to be secured, is unauthorised; and
(c) he knows at the time when he causes the computer to perform the function that that is the case.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—
(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both;

daltons

 In the recent illegal cyber-attack, a number of LinkedIn articles were deleted. These will be republished from backup data over the next few weeks. Opportunity will be taken to update the articles as necessary. A link to the first of these articles is included below.

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/freedom-information-request-reveals-exact-c-richard-marsh/Deprox

As a number of deproxfraud.info readers have pointed out, some videos were also lost from the site as a result of the associated Vimeo and Youtube channels being hacked and deleted. These have now been restored, and are reproduced below:

TOM LISTER

Video Deprox

 

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Anatomy of a cyber-attack

It is hard to operate in cyberspace without leaving a trail. The September 25th cyber attack on deproxfraud.info, and whistleblower Richard Marsh’s personal Facebook, Google, Gmail, Twitter, Dropbox, Vimeo, WordPress, YouTube and Twitter accounts shows a particularly grubby set of fingerprints that the Norfolk CID will doubtless be familiar with…

Richard Marsh is resident in Saskatchewan, Canada, and has been since January 2017. Thus when social media sites detected “persons unknown” logging in to the administration areas of his websites and pages from locations in Norfolk UK, they automatically sent out Security Alert emails to the page or website owner.

From the flurry of security alerts received on the 25th and 26th September, an exact timeline of the hacker’s activity can be constructed. Note that the email times are for Saskatchewan, which is 7 hours behind the UK. The hacker started by illegally accessing Richard’s Twitter account at 20.33 from a location in King’s Lynn, Norfolk. This generated the security alert below at 13.33 Saskatchewan time.

fentiman hack

September 25th, 2017

13.33 Twitter new login from King’s Lynn, Norfolk

13.40 Facebook password reset

13.47 Twitter password reset

13.54 Twitter email address changed

14.34 WordPress (deproxfraud.info) email address changed

15.22 Vimeo account deleted

15.23 Gmail account security alert: Sign in from a Blackberry device in the UK

18.31 Dropbox account accessed from Terrington St. Clement, Norfolk

19.33 New email address “rubbish@sasktel.net” added to LinkedIn account

September 26th, 2017

01.58 Romer Photonics Company page removed from LinkedIn

05.16 Facebook account login from Whittlesford, UK

The directors of Hygiene Solutions Ltd and their partners in crime might like to contemplate the fate of young Gareth Crosskey, who was sentenced to a year in prison for hacking a Facebook Account.

fentiman hack facebook

Victory! Judge dismisses Fentiman’s gagging order.

The Honourable Mr. Justice B.A. Barrington-Foote has dismissed Hygiene Solutions’ application to register a gagging order against Richard Marsh, and awarded costs to the applicant.

Canadian justice has thus defended the right of a whistleblower to speak out in defence of the life and health of hospital patients worldwide. The deproxfraud.info website will continue its exposure of the fraudulent and astonishingly ineffective Deprox and Ultra-V hospital decontamination systems and the criminal activities of Hygiene Solutions’ directors.

Justice.PNG

Justice

Fentiman attacks whistleblower…again.

Stung by the damning exposure of the Ultra-V’s incredibly poor performance against C. difficile (log0.1 – log1.1) Hygiene Solutions Ltd. director, Rick Fentiman made a further attack in the Regina Court of Queen’s Bench on Friday against whistleblower Richard Marsh.

Fentiman’s lawyer, F. William Johnson QC spoke for almost a hour, on the theme “Corporations have a right to defend their reputation.” Judge The Hon. Brian Barrington-Foote, was not persuaded, and has reserved judgement.

Fentiman is attempting to register a gagging order that would prevent Richard Marsh from disclosing any further information about “Hygiene Solutions Ltd, its directors, employees or Deprox product.”  As a precaution, Richard has put in place a comprehensive backup plan to ensure that deproxfraud.info continues to publish unhindered even if the gagging order is passed.

This contingency plan depends on the fact that the gagging order is specific to Richard Marsh, and limited in its scope to Saskatchewan. The first two elements in the plan have already been enacted:

  • The ownership of the website has been transferred to an anonymous third party in Asia.
  • The Editorship of the site has been transferred to Dr Ecosse, who is not a Canadian resident.

The final element, which will only be put in to effect should the gagging order be allowed, is to transfer authorship of the blog posts to Dr Ecosse. It should be noted that Dr Ecosse has very deep personal reasons of his own to take issue with Hygiene Solutions, he is in no sense acting as an agent, and is certainly not being remunerated for his efforts. Dr Ecosse is also exceptionally well qualified to review and comment on the fraudulent activities of Hygiene Solutions Ltd. from a medical and scientific standpoint.

Whistleblower3 Ultra-V

Once this final step has been taken, deproxfraud.info will continue to publish indefinitely without any input whatever from Richard Marsh, and Hygiene Solutions’ lawyers will have the interesting task of tracking down Dr. Ecosse, who may prove to be rather elusive…

Whistleblower Ultra-V

 

 

Fentiman denied employees PPE, gas detectors.

Deprox2

Gordon’s Story

Gordon Cunningham started working for Hygiene Solutions early in 2013, building and servicing the Deprox machines, as well as operating the system in hospitals across the UK. He noticed that at the end of a decontamination process, the treated rooms often still had a visible white mist in the air, although the Deprox remote control light indicated that the room was safe to enter. He raised his concerns with company directors Rick and Mark Fentiman, but was told that there was nothing to worry about and that the process was entirely safe. Nonetheless, he requested a respirator and a hydrogen peroxide (H2O2) gas monitor (Draeger) to protect himself when using the Deprox, but his request was ignored.

Gordon, a non-smoker who keeps fit by running and triathlons, began to experience a tender sensation in his throat after being exposed to the Deprox residual vapour. These symptoms progressed to an asthma like feeling of a constricted airway and a hoarse cough.

The business owners, Rick and Mark Fentiman insisted that re-entering a treated room was safe, as long as the H2O2 level was below 5.5ppm. (In fact, the safe exposure level is 1ppm)

Gordon then spoke to the chemist who was working on the Deprox project, David Sempere Aracil. David told him that he should not be entering rooms at 5.5ppm.

In June 2014, Gordon was asked to spend 3 days operating the Deprox system at the Luton and Dunstable Hospital. Six months had passed since he requested a respirator but his request had not been responded to. When re-entering the rooms, he would try to cover his mouth and get the windows open as quickly as possible, to minimize his exposure. Gordon noticed one of the technicians had a new Draeger H2O2 meter, and he asked how it was operated. The technician explained how to use the meter, and how to set it so that it would sound an alarm buzzer until the gas concentration had dropped to a safe level. Gordon had done some research, so he knew the safe level was 1ppm. Gordon took the Draeger to Luton with him.

On Monday June 2nd 2014 Gordon had two rooms for Deprox treatment at the Luton and Dunstable Hospital. The first room was the equipment library. He set up a Deprox unit in this room, and 1 ½ hours later the green light on the Deprox remote control lit, indicating that the room was safe to enter. He un-taped the door, and followed the instructions from the technician, used the Draeger to check the gas concentration – it was 7.8ppm. Gordon left the Draeger in the room and taped the door closed again. Further to the technician’s instructions, there will be a continuous alarm tone until the safe level of 1 ppm was reached, the room will then be safe to enter.

Later in the day, some hospital staff wanted access to the library to get some equipment. Gordon explained that it was not safe to enter until the Draeger had indicated a safe level.

Four hours after the process had completed, the room was still inaccessible, as the Draeger was still giving an alarm tone. Gordon was summoned to the office of Camilla, head of Domestic Services. Camilla demanded to know what the problem was in the library, pointing out that in the Hygiene Solutions Deprox literature the “deactivation” cycle is only 90 minutes, and that they never normally had to wait longer than that. Gordon explained about the Draeger, and that the equipment library was not yet a safe environment.

A little later Gordon was summoned to the office again, and told that “Your boss, Mark Fentiman is on the phone, and says you are to take the Draeger out of the library immediately.” Mark Fentiman then phoned Gordon directly and ordered him to remove the Draeger and open up the library to the hospital staff.

Gordon un-taped the door and entered the room. The H2O2 level according to the Draeger was at 4.3ppm, well above the safety limit. Gordon removed the Draeger and opened up the room, telling the hospital staff to wait as long as possible to let the gas disperse.

Hygiene Solutions told the hospital that Gordon was using equipment that was not calibrated, and that he had not been trained on, and that the gas levels in the room had been completely safe. In fact, the meter was freshly calibrated, and Gordon has copies of the all calibration certificates to prove it.

Other staff members, including Tim Murrell, the Deprox patent holder, witnessed Mark Fentiman’s fury at the news. Tim said he had “never seen someone so angry” as when Mark found out that Gordon had taken a Draeger to Luton.

Gordon lost his job that week. The other staff at Hygiene Solutions were told it was because he used an uncalibrated meter without permission.

Gordon still suffers from respiratory problems as a result of his exposure to the Deprox fog. It may well be that inhaling the combination of hydrogen peroxide and silver nitrate has caused irreversible damage to his trachea and lungs.

Deprox

Comments

Update: http://www.deproxfraud.info achieved 40,000 views as of this afternoon, and now ranks higher on Google than Hygiene Solutions’ own website!

Fentiman’s Toxic Legacy

After two years of misinformation, deceit and outright lies, fake “Cambridge graduate microbiologist” Rick Fentiman has to admit that his Deprox process leaves hospital rooms and equipment contaminated with highly toxic silver nitrate dust. A recent investigation at the University College London NHS Trust revealed the following figures:

  • Silver Nitrate content of Deproxin solution: 10 – 25mg/l
  • Silver Nitrate deposited on room surfaces after a single cycle: 1.5 – 2.5mg/m2

An independent test of the same parameters by Butterworth gave similar results:

  • (Deproxin) Silver expressed as Ag (by Plasma Emission Spectroscopy) 51.0mg/l
  • (Deproxin) Nitrate expressed as NO(by ion chromatography)  35.1mg/l

Surface deposits after single cycle:

  • (Surface) Silver expressed as Ag (by Plasma Emission Spectroscopy) 2.5mg/m2
  • (Surface) Nitrate expressed as NO(by ion chromatography) 1.8mg/m2

Silver nitrate is persistent in the environment, and will build up cumulatively each time a room is processed. The permitted level of silver nitrate dust in the air is vanishingly small. The legal maximum is 0.01mg/m³ –  250 times this amount of the chemical is deposited on each square metre of surface per process! 

This presents a particular danger to hospital staff making up the bed after a Deprox process – laying down the mattress and placing sheets will disturb clouds of the fine dust at very hazardous levels. Staff should certainly be provided with appropriate respiratory equipment for this task, and silver nitrate dust levels should be monitored before readmitting patients. 

Rooms that have become heavily contaminated by multiple processes may need decontaminating by Hazchem professionals.

Silver Nitrate deposits at the Royal Liverpool Hospital

capture

Isolation rooms at the Royal Liverpool University Hospital have become so heavily contaminated with silver nitrate that patients have complained, mistaking the black deposits on the windows for dirt. Director of nursing Lisa Grant admitted that the Hydrogen Peroxide Vapour (HPV) bio-decontamination system leaves a “sterile residue” but was apparently unaware that it is silver nitrate. The photo above was submitted to The Liverpool Echo by a patient who attempted to remove the chemical with a tissue. There is enough silver nitrate on the tissue to cause unpleasant chemical burns to the skin. Even more seriously, the AgNO3 dust levels in the room must have been far in excess of the legal maximum, which is an invisibly small 0.01mg/m³ – that’s 1/100,000th of a gram per cubic metre of air.

Rick Fentiman

Rick Fentiman claims to be a "Cambridge graduate microbiologist"