Fentiman denied employees PPE, gas detectors.

Deprox2

Gordon’s Story

Gordon Cunningham started working for Hygiene Solutions early in 2013, building and servicing the Deprox machines, as well as operating the system in hospitals across the UK. He noticed that at the end of a decontamination process, the treated rooms often still had a visible white mist in the air, although the Deprox remote control light indicated that the room was safe to enter. He raised his concerns with company directors Rick and Mark Fentiman, but was told that there was nothing to worry about and that the process was entirely safe. Nonetheless, he requested a respirator and a hydrogen peroxide (H2O2) gas monitor (Draeger) to protect himself when using the Deprox, but his request was ignored.

Gordon, a non-smoker who keeps fit by running and triathlons, began to experience a tender sensation in his throat after being exposed to the Deprox residual vapour. These symptoms progressed to an asthma like feeling of a constricted airway and a hoarse cough.

The business owners, Rick and Mark Fentiman insisted that re-entering a treated room was safe, as long as the H2O2 level was below 5.5ppm. (In fact, the safe exposure level is 1ppm)

Gordon then spoke to the chemist who was working on the Deprox project, David Sempere Aracil. David told him that he should not be entering rooms at 5.5ppm.

In June 2014, Gordon was asked to spend 3 days operating the Deprox system at the Luton and Dunstable Hospital. Six months had passed since he requested a respirator but his request had not been responded to. When re-entering the rooms, he would try to cover his mouth and get the windows open as quickly as possible, to minimize his exposure. Gordon noticed one of the technicians had a new Draeger H2O2 meter, and he asked how it was operated. The technician explained how to use the meter, and how to set it so that it would sound an alarm buzzer until the gas concentration had dropped to a safe level. Gordon had done some research, so he knew the safe level was 1ppm. Gordon took the Draeger to Luton with him.

On Monday June 2nd 2014 Gordon had two rooms for Deprox treatment at the Luton and Dunstable Hospital. The first room was the equipment library. He set up a Deprox unit in this room, and 1 ½ hours later the green light on the Deprox remote control lit, indicating that the room was safe to enter. He un-taped the door, and followed the instructions from the technician, used the Draeger to check the gas concentration – it was 7.8ppm. Gordon left the Draeger in the room and taped the door closed again. Further to the technician’s instructions, there will be a continuous alarm tone until the safe level of 1 ppm was reached, the room will then be safe to enter.

Later in the day, some hospital staff wanted access to the library to get some equipment. Gordon explained that it was not safe to enter until the Draeger had indicated a safe level.

Four hours after the process had completed, the room was still inaccessible, as the Draeger was still giving an alarm tone. Gordon was summoned to the office of Camilla, head of Domestic Services. Camilla demanded to know what the problem was in the library, pointing out that in the Hygiene Solutions Deprox literature the “deactivation” cycle is only 90 minutes, and that they never normally had to wait longer than that. Gordon explained about the Draeger, and that the equipment library was not yet a safe environment.

A little later Gordon was summoned to the office again, and told that “Your boss, Mark Fentiman is on the phone, and says you are to take the Draeger out of the library immediately.” Mark Fentiman then phoned Gordon directly and ordered him to remove the Draeger and open up the library to the hospital staff.

Gordon un-taped the door and entered the room. The H2O2 level according to the Draeger was at 4.3ppm, well above the safety limit. Gordon removed the Draeger and opened up the room, telling the hospital staff to wait as long as possible to let the gas disperse.

Hygiene Solutions told the hospital that Gordon was using equipment that was not calibrated, and that he had not been trained on, and that the gas levels in the room had been completely safe. In fact, the meter was freshly calibrated, and Gordon has copies of the all calibration certificates to prove it.

Other staff members, including Tim Murrell, the Deprox patent holder, witnessed Mark Fentiman’s fury at the news. Tim said he had “never seen someone so angry” as when Mark found out that Gordon had taken a Draeger to Luton.

Gordon lost his job that week. The other staff at Hygiene Solutions were told it was because he used an uncalibrated meter without permission.

Gordon still suffers from respiratory problems as a result of his exposure to the Deprox fog. It may well be that inhaling the combination of hydrogen peroxide and silver nitrate has caused irreversible damage to his trachea and lungs.

Deprox

Comments

Update: http://www.deproxfraud.info achieved 40,000 views as of this afternoon, and now ranks higher on Google than Hygiene Solutions’ own website!

Fentiman’s UCLH Hoax

 

A letter published this week by Prof. Wilson of UCLH finally proves how Hygiene Solutions’ (Deprox) director Rick Fentiman cheated both the UCLH and rival HPV system manufacturer Bioquell Plc, in a widely publicized comparative test in 2015. The results of this test apparently demonstrated that the Deprox, vapourising a 5% Hydrogen peroxide solution had identical germicidal efficacy as the Bioquell system vapourising 35% hydrogen peroxide solution.

I published an article in 2016 in which I analyzed the test results as published by Professor Wilson and colleagues in the Journal of Hospital Infection, and concluded that Fentiman had in fact filled the internal tank of the Deprox machine with a 35% solution prior to the test. New data published in the letter proves this claim beyond reasonable doubt.

In Wilson’s original test, neither the aerial concentration of H2O2 vapour , or the concentration of the liquid solutions was  measured.

In response to widespread concern and comment as to the rather surprising results obtained, Wilson recently again obtained the use of a Bioquell and a Deprox system and measured the concentrations of both the liquid and aerial vapour phases throughout their test cycles, as detailed in this week’s letter.

The Deprox was using 5% H2O2 solution, and produced peak vapour concentrations of 29 to 46ppm. The Bioquell machine was using a 35% solution, and produced 450 to 640ppm of vapour.

The maximum aerial concentration of H2O2 that can be generated is limited by the concentration of the original solution. Henry’s law can be used to prove that about 50ppm is the maximum sustained aerial concentration that can be generated from a 5% solution. The figure of 46ppm for Deprox from Wilson’s retest of the machine is thus exactly what would be expected.

In the original comparative test, both the Deprox and the Bioquell systems demonstrated practically identical efficacies of log 5.1 for spores and log 6.3 for vegetative bacteria. A very large number of biological indicators of several species were used over multiple tests, and no significant difference in performance between the two systems was found.

Therefore, inescapably, both systems must have generated the same aerial concentration of H2O2 vapour, and that must have been in the region of 400 to 700ppm. (There are numerous published papers demonstrating a log 6 efficacy for HPV systems using 30-35% H2O2 solutions)

It is physically impossible to generate anything close to these levels of vapour by evaporating or aerosolizing a 5% solution. Quite apart from Henry’s law, the volume of water that would have to be evaporated along with the H2O2 would quickly push the relative humidity to saturation, and prevent further evaporation from taking place.

Therefore, in the original comparative tests as published in the Journal of Hospital Infection, the Deprox was NOT running on a 5% H2O2 solution as claimed, but on a 35% solution, the same as the Bioquell system.

How then was this deception accomplished?

There are some aspects of the way in which the original UCLH tests were conducted that  are very suggestive:

At the time of the tests, Hygiene Solutions had a contract with UCLH, and had 4 Deprox machines permanently on site, which were operated daily by Hygiene Solutions employees. UCLH had a definite rule that the equipment was not to be operated by their staff – hence no UCLH staff were trained in the use of the equipment.

The paper states:  “The HPS1 unit was operated by a trained engineer (Bioquell), while the HPS2 module was operated by hospital staff following training by a dedicated member of the issuing manufacturer (i.e. Hygiene Solutions).”

I have two independent witnesses that the two Deprox machines were used in the trial were not the machines already on site, but were specially prepared at the Kings Lynn depot, with all new piezo discs and calatytic deactivation media. The machines were driven up to UCLH personally by Rick Fentiman, who stayed for the duration of the tests then drove the machines back to Lynn. Apparently no other Hygiene Solutions staff were involved. The “dedicated member” therefore was Rick Fentiman, and he instructed and supervised some unidentified member of the “hospital staff” in the operation of the equipment “on the spot”.

The paper says: “However, during this study, both parties provided storage of equipment and hydrogen peroxide stock solutions off-site.” In the case of the Deprox units, this was  the large van in which they were transported. Clearly then there would have been opportunity for Mr Fentiman to have filled the internal storage tank of the test machines with a 35% solution and disposed of or diluted any residual fluid after the test, without either his own employees or the UCLH staff being aware of the substitution.

It is pertinent that (unknown to the UCLH) the Deprox has a substantial internal storage tank, of about 8 litres capacity.

capo2

Illustration from the Deprox patent.

The evaporation unit draws from the bottom of this tank, and the 2 litre Deproxin refill bottles trickle feed in to the top of the tank. I assume that for the sake of authenticity, a genuine Deproxin refill was inserted in to the top of the machine for the tests, hence even if Prof Wilson had tested the concentration of the fluid, he would have found it to be as stated. As concentrated H2O2 solution is substantially denser than water, a trickle of dilute solution in to the top of the tank would have no significant effect over the course of a few cycles of the machine.

Deprox salesman Tom Lister stalls when faced with a direct question about the UCLH tests. The machines had been filled with a 35% hydrogen peroxide solution, where UCLH were told it was a 5% solution. Tom knows this, and his guilty conscience shows very clearly in his body language and facial expressions. Rather than answer he says “Where did you say you were from?” although I had just told him, and was wearing a badge with the answer in large type!

 

Fentiman backs off…

fentiman churchill

At the Regina Court this morning, F. William Johnson, QC., BA., LL.B., B.C.L. (OXON) representing Specialist Hygiene Solutions Ltd, preempted the proceedings by requesting an adjournment as instructed by his client.

I have no doubt whatever that the unprecedented response to yesterday’s deproxfraud.info post is the reason for this abrupt about-turn.

By the end of the day, that one article had received a staggering 595 hits, and this in spite of the USA being otherwise occupied. The top 5 countries of origin are listed below:

Fentiman visits

A heartfelt thank you to everyone who visited the site, and especially to those who spread the word via social media to achieve this resounding endorsement of the battle against corrupt medical equipment manufacturers.

UPDATE: INTENSE INTEREST IN DEPROX CASE

Since the news of Fentiman’s intended legal action was published, late on July 3rd, the blog posts have received an unprecedented 1349 views, 373 of which were from Australia and New Zealand. At the time of writing, 10.22am July 6th, today’s views are already at 190 and rising fast!

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deproxfraud.info views as of 10.22 am July 6th.

 

Fentiman seeks court order to gag Deprox whistleblower

regina_courthouse

Regina Courthouse

On Wednesday 5th July 2017, Hygiene Solutions Ltd. will attempt to register a gagging order against Richard Marsh, a former Deprox engineer, in an attempt to close down the highly embarrassing deproxfraud.info website.

The hearing will be before The Honourable Mr. Justice B.A. Barrington-Foote, who had already rejected a previous submission from Fentiman on the same lines. The case is at 9.00am, at the Regina Court of the Queen’s  Bench, 2425 Victoria Avenue, Regina, SK  S4P 4W6, Phone: (306) 787-5377.

The hearing is open to the public, and the documents filed in connection with the case may be examined and copied at the Registrar’s desk in the Courthouse.

It is of note that after 9 months and (as of this afternoon) 35,634 views of deproxfraud.info, Hygiene Solutions has finally attempted this legal action by way of an obscure legal instrument called a “Tomlin Order”.  If the shocking allegations made by deproxfraud.info are false, as Fentiman and Co. maintain, why wouldn’t they have sued for libel and defamation in September when the website was first published?

While the application is expected to fail, deproxfraud.info will continue publication regardless of the outcome.

UPDATE: RECORD DAILY HITS ON COURT CASE BLOG POST

This post has broken the record for daily hits. Since publication yesterday afternoon, this post has received 553 hits and still rising fast. The daily total is expected to top 600.

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Freedom of Information request reveals exact C. difficile/Deprox correlation.

C. difficile 1

A Freedom of Information request¹ to UCLH disclosed the starting and finishing dates of their disastrous Deprox decontamination contract with Hygiene Solutions Ltd. The Deprox operations started in June 2013 and ran continuously, 7 days per week through to October 2016. The contract called for at least 4 Deprox units to be at the hospital, and 6 or more processes to be completed daily.

However, due to frequent breakdowns, Hygiene Solutions struggled to meet their obligations, and on occasion asked engineers to put a non-functional Deprox unit in a room, tape up the door and “run” a process – thus not only defrauding the NHS but leaving a dangerously contaminated room that the staff believed to have been sterilized.

Plotting the contract dates against the quarterly UCLH C. difficile data² (extended through 2016 with mandatory government reporting data)³  reveals an exact correlation between the period of Deprox deployment and a substantial step change in the number of C.difficile infections  – approximately 70 extra cases over the 29 month period.

According to the March 2016 government report on C. difficile mortality, the 30 day mortality rates for the London area were about 17%. –  suggesting that approximately 12 deaths in this period could be attributed to Deprox operations. Any patients who acquired C. difficile or any other Heathcare Associated Infection, (HAI) in the UCLH hospitals between June 2013 and October 2015 should consider contacting a medical negligence solicitor and seeking compensation.

Deprox pushed UCLH in to high risk category for C. diff – CQC reports.

The CQC (Care Quality Commission) makes regular evaluations of NHS trusts using a list of critical indicators. These are the Intelligent Monitoring reports. The extracts from a series of these reports below show how the “Incidence of C. difficile” indicator moved from “No evidence of risk” to “Elevated Risk” when the Deprox program was implemented. The complete reports can be found at: http://www.cqc.org.uk/provider/RRV/reports

Deprox UCLH

[1] https://www.uclh.nhs.uk/aboutus/wwd/Annual%20reviews%20plans%20and%20reports%20archive/Infection%20Control%20Annual%20Report%202015-16.pdf  (See graph, p.17)

[2] https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/clostridium-difficile-infection-monthly-data-by-nhs-acute-trust

[3] https://www.uclh.nhs.uk/aboutus/FOI/FOI%20disclosure%20list/FOI2017271Response.pdf

https://www.dropbox.com/s/71u3j3fcdqwqfnj/ResponseFOI2017271.xlsx%20%28~13%20KB%29.URL?dl=0

“A despicable act.” – Judge Williams speaks out on NHS fraud.

Judge Adele Williams

Judge Adele Williams

Judgement was pronounced on a £26,000 NHS fraud last week. The perpetrators only escaped jail as they had pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity and had repaid the money in full.

But Judge Adele Williams described it as a

” – mean, thoroughly dishonest and cynical fraud.”

She said further: –

“To deprive the NHS even indirectly of cash and funds when it is hard-pressed and needs every penny available is a despicable act.”

What would the Judge have to say to the perpetrators of an £8,000,000 fraud against the NHS? Even if the directors of Hygiene Solutions were to refund the NHS for the tens of thousands of fraudulent Deprox processes they have done over the years, (see https://deproxfraud.info/2017/03/13/leaked-emails-prove-test-cheating-bodily-harm-and-massive-fraud/ )  would they escape jail?

The following comment was received from a retired NHS nurse today…
“Rick F should be forced to make reparation on top of all due penalties. I suggest that he should, after being found guilty of fraud, be forced to attend the next infection prevention conference, with patient groups invited to give family impact statements in cases where relatives have become infected when Deprox has been in house. What the nurses would like to do with him I will leave to your imagination.”