2 more Deprox operators hit with throat and lung damage.

Exchange of messages between Richard Marsh and a former Deprox operator. This brings the total of Deprox operators suffering chronic respiratory damage to four – the two mentioned below, plus Gordon Cunningham, plus Maria Cardioso from Worcester.

For the background to this issue, see Toxic Legacy

 

Deprox 1

Deprox 2

Deprox 3

Deprox 4

Reproduced below is a doctor’s letter to Hygiene Solutions Ltd, requesting information  to assist in treating  Maria Cardioso, an ISS Mediclean hospital cleaner who was operating Deprox units in the Worcestershire Royal Hospital. This was in January 2015. The operators above were still operating Deprox in 2016 without PPE and without being warned by Hygiene Solutions Ltd about the danger of the silver nitrate in the Deproxin fog they were inhaling.

maria-cardoso

Standard safety label for Silver Nitrate specifically warning of toxicity to lungs and mucous membranes.

AgNO3

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The pig got up and slowly walked away…

pig

In a knee-jerk reaction to my last post, Hygiene Solutions yesterday deleted the Sydney NSW street address from their website. Australia and the USA are left with only phone numbers, which are connected to a UK call centre, and the New Zealand contact has been deleted in its entirety.

The post had pointed out that the Hygiene Solutions 65 Atkins Road, Ermington, Sydney, NSW 2155 address is owned by Greg Hales, son of controversial ‘Exclusive Brethren” cult leader Bruce Hales.

https://www.google.ca/maps/place/65+Atkins+Rd,+Ermington+NSW+2115,+Australia

Here is the million dollar question:

Who is disowning who?

Is Rick Fentiman ashamed of his links with the Hales cult, or are the Hales’ embarrassed to be associated with the fraudulent and dishonest activities of Hygiene Solutions?

One evening in October
When I was about one-third sober
And was taking home a load with manly pride
My poor feet began to stutter
So I lay down in the gutter
And a pig came up and lay down by my side

As I lay there in the gutter
thinking thoughts I could not utter
I thought I heard a passing lady say,
“You can tell a man who boozes
by the company he chooses…”
And the pig got up and slowly walked away

Before…

Hygiene Solutions old

After…

Hygiene Solutions new

 

CANBERRA SHARK ATTACK!

Deprox hales acipc 2017

On 2nd February 2017, in response to publication of the whistleblower exposé of the Deprox fraud, Specialist Hygiene Solutions Australia Pty Ltd declared voluntary liquidation, and Australian Deprox distributor Acute Healthcare hastily dropped the product from its catalogue.

However, in order to to maintain product registration with the ARTG (Australian Register of Therapeutic Devices) Hygiene Solutions (UK) must have a registered Australian company as sponsor.

It has emerged that a second business, under the name Specialist Hygiene Solutions Australia has been created with a new ABN  – this is a partnership, rather than a limited company – and this new entity has taken over sponsorship of the Deprox and Deproxin products.

Unfortunately, Australian business practices are less than transparent, and short of legal action it is impossible to identify who the beneficial owners of this Australian partnership are. The only identity given is “The Trustee for the RS & HR family Trust and others”  Like Panamian bank accounts and Cayman Island investment trusts, this legitimised  anonymity is very convenient for individuals wishing to invest in unethical or fraudulent trading, as funds can be easily laundered through a web of interconnected Australian family trusts.

However, a search of the history reveals that the original name of “The Trustee for the RS & HR family Trust and others” was “THE TRUSTEE FOR RS & HR FAMILY TRUST & THE TRUSTEE FOR THE AT SITE SUPPLIES TRUST & THE TRUSTEE FOR THE HALES TRUST”

Furthermore, a search of Australian trademarks reveals the following:

Deprox 4

The  LinkedIn profile shows that  Gregory Hales was a director of At Site Supplies, and is currently the director of SafeSmart Access. Both SafeSmart Access and Hygiene Solutions limited share the same Sydney, NSW address.

SafeSmart Access

Deprox hales

It seems likely  therefore that the Australian Deprox operation is run by Gregory Jay Hales, a prominent member of the so called “Hales Exclusive Brethren” a highly controversial religious sect headquartered in Sydney, Australia.

Australian relaunch in Canberra

Rick Fentiman, Hygiene Solutions Ltd director and self-appointed “Cambridge University Microbiologist” will be exhibiting at the Australasian College of Infection Prevention and Control (ACIPC) exhibition in Canberra, 20-22 November 2017. He will doubtless be bringing his “Proxcide” Mk. III Deprox prototype, as well as the Deprox and Ultra-V systems to display.

Hygiene Solutions Ltd has also splashed out $10,300 to become a “Bronze Sponsor” of the ACIP exhibition, over and above the $6,600 for the booth. This level of investment suggests a major push in to the Australian market, and it is rumoured that the Fentimans may be relocating to Australia along with their business, thus evading a number of impending legal actions in the UK. Given Australia’s historic function as a penal colony, this move would seem to be entirely appropriate.

Deprox 1

Any hospitals considering these systems should first give sober consideration to the tragic experience of the UCLH hospital in London, where a C. difficile epidemic following the introduction of the Deprox system led to an estimated 12 deaths over a period of 3 years.

 

Legal Action taken re. cyber-attack

 

Legal action is being taken against the directors of Hygiene Solutions Ltd in connection with flagrant breaches of the Computer Misuse Act 1990. See:

https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/18/crossheading/computer-misuse-offences

The relevant sections of the Act are summarized below:

Computer misuse offences

1 Unauthorised access to computer material.
(1)A person is guilty of an offence if—
(a) he causes a computer to perform any function with intent to secure access to any program or data held in any computer, or to enable any such access to be secured ;
(b) the access he intends to secure, or to enable to be secured, is unauthorised; and
(c) he knows at the time when he causes the computer to perform the function that that is the case.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—
(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both;

daltons

 In the recent illegal cyber-attack, a number of LinkedIn articles were deleted. These will be republished from backup data over the next few weeks. Opportunity will be taken to update the articles as necessary. A link to the first of these articles is included below.

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/freedom-information-request-reveals-exact-c-richard-marsh/Deprox

As a number of deproxfraud.info readers have pointed out, some videos were also lost from the site as a result of the associated Vimeo and Youtube channels being hacked and deleted. These have now been restored, and are reproduced below:

TOM LISTER

Video Deprox

 

Anatomy of a cyber-attack

It is hard to operate in cyberspace without leaving a trail. The September 25th cyber attack on deproxfraud.info, and whistleblower Richard Marsh’s personal Facebook, Google, Gmail, Twitter, Dropbox, Vimeo, WordPress, YouTube and Twitter accounts shows a particularly grubby set of fingerprints that the Norfolk CID will doubtless be familiar with…

Richard Marsh is resident in Saskatchewan, Canada, and has been since January 2017. Thus when social media sites detected “persons unknown” logging in to the administration areas of his websites and pages from locations in Norfolk UK, they automatically sent out Security Alert emails to the page or website owner.

From the flurry of security alerts received on the 25th and 26th September, an exact timeline of the hacker’s activity can be constructed. Note that the email times are for Saskatchewan, which is 7 hours behind the UK. The hacker started by illegally accessing Richard’s Twitter account at 20.33 from a location in King’s Lynn, Norfolk. This generated the security alert below at 13.33 Saskatchewan time.

fentiman hack

September 25th, 2017

13.33 Twitter new login from King’s Lynn, Norfolk

13.40 Facebook password reset

13.47 Twitter password reset

13.54 Twitter email address changed

14.34 WordPress (deproxfraud.info) email address changed

15.22 Vimeo account deleted

15.23 Gmail account security alert: Sign in from a Blackberry device in the UK

18.31 Dropbox account accessed from Terrington St. Clement, Norfolk

19.33 New email address “rubbish@sasktel.net” added to LinkedIn account

September 26th, 2017

01.58 Romer Photonics Company page removed from LinkedIn

05.16 Facebook account login from Whittlesford, UK

The directors of Hygiene Solutions Ltd and their partners in crime might like to contemplate the fate of young Gareth Crosskey, who was sentenced to a year in prison for hacking a Facebook Account.

fentiman hack facebook

Surfacide v. Ultra-V – If you can’t beat them…cheat them.

Trials in real hospital environments present the most accurate and convincing measure of the comparative efficacy of the various area decontamination systems offered. Highly qualified microbiologists go to great lengths to ensure that both the environment in the rooms and the test organisms are matched as precisely as possible for the different systems being compared, and that the tests are as far as possible closely representative of genuine hospital situations.

It is obvious that these tests are only meaningful if the decontamination systems under test are also operated exactly as they would be in everyday use, i.e. using the same methods and timing as the manufacturer recommends.

Unfortunately, a small minority of manufacturers are prepared to abuse the trust of the scientific community, and deliberately move the goalposts to give their equipment an unfair advantage.

A recently published comparative test of the Surfacide versus the Ultra-V UV-C systems, conducted by the UCLH Clinical Microbiology Lab is a sad example of this deceitful and unfair practice. As might be expected of the UCLH, the preparation of the rooms and the microbiological testing was done carefully and thoroughly. The test however was sabotaged by Ultra-V manufacturer, Hygiene Solutions Ltd, who rather than operating their machine in line with their published procedures, instead took the following measures in an attempt to cheat the competition of a fair outcome:

  1. They extended the exposure time four fold, from the claimed 20 minutes to over 80 minutes.
  2. They repositioned the unit several times during each process – contrary to their published claim that the unit will decontaminate a whole room from a single central location.

The Surfacide system, meanwhile, was operated exactly as the manufacturer describes – without relocation, and with the exposure set by the integral measuring system.

In spite of this grossly unfair advantage, the Ultra-V still gave a significantly inferior performance to Surfacide – particularly in respect of C. difficile spores, where the following log reductions were obtained:

IPS Infection Prevention 2017 #IP2017 Ultra-V Surfacide C difficile

For C. difficile with low soiling, the Ultra-V in spite of its unfair advantages, averaged a log reduction of just 0.58 as compared with Surfacide which averaged a useful, if not dramatic, log 2.5.

What then would the results of a FAIR test have been? Or in other words, what can we expect the Ultra-V to achieve in real, everyday use? Numerous studies demonstrate that log reduction with time is essentially linear in the range of log 0 to 5. As Ultra-V is actually only used with a 20 minute rather than an 80 minute exposure, we can expect the log reductions in 20 minutes to be about 25% of the figures obtained in the test.

Replotting the bar graphs from the UCLH poster presentation gives the following comparison, which represents the real relative performance of the two systems:

IPS Infection Prevention 2017 #IP2017 Ultra-V Surfacide C difficile NHS.png

It is clear at a glance that for MRSA, and K. pneumoniae , Ultra-V averages well below log 2, and its efficacy against C. difficile is negligible. However, the Hygiene Solutions website boldly makes the following claim:

Ultra-V

Ultra-V 2.PNG

What independent research is referred to here? – Just ask Hygiene Solutions –  they will send you a copy of the sabotaged UCLH study analysed above…

Ultra-V efficacy “insignificant” in 75% of terminal cleans – NHS study.

Hygiene Solutions own Corrado Gilbert, along with Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust Infection Prevention Nurse Matthew Reid and others published the study below in the Journal of Infection Prevention.

Two observations:

From the table at the bottom of the Abstract, we see that the mean CFU drops from 15.71 to 2.92 as a result of the Ultra-V process. This is a 5 fold reduction. Hygiene Solutions website promises a log4 to log6 efficacy for Ultra-V, i.e. a 10,000 fold to 1,000,000 fold reduction. How do Hygiene Solutions account for the difference?

From “Results” we see that only 25% of the rooms had a statistically significant reduction in CFU. How do Hygiene Solutions explain the 75% of rooms that had no significant reduction in CFU?

Ultra-V

The original article can be downloaded below. See page 16 of the pdf.

http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1757177415599501

Alternatively the abstract is also published here, and can be accessed without subscription. Scroll down just over a quarter of the page to find the article.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5074091/