Published on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/when-ok-cheat-win-business-oliver-canty
Published on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/when-ok-cheat-win-business-oliver-canty
“We have evidence that warnings were ignored and that these products continued to be used despite the warnings and that following the infections…[there was] a cover-up,” – Andy Evans, chairman of campaign group Tainted Blood
These quotations from today’s news refer not to the Deprox, but to the tragic suffering and loss of life from infected blood administered by the NHS in the 70s and 80s. At last, there is to be an inquiry, and the victims’ relatives will know how and why 2,400 NHS patients died.
Meanwhile a disturbingly similar tragedy is unfolding right here and now – and again the NHS turns a blind eye for fear of negligence lawsuits, and the corrupt medical suppliers hastily reap the profits before the mounting evidence of fraud and corruption forces them back to the dark places that spawned them.
The victims – the frail elderly, the cancer patients, the cystic fibrosis sufferers, have no idea that the C. difficile or MRSA infections they have suffered from were preventable. They are assured that the hospital rooms and equipment have been sterilised by the best technology available – the Deprox – which according to the Hygiene Solutions Ltd. website, “…achieves a log 6 reduction of even the most virulent of organisms.”
The truth is in stark contrast to this glib fabrication; – leaked emails and the testimony of former Hygiene Solutions employees prove that the Deprox units are turned up to their maximum output of RH30 when tested, but in everyday use are turned down to output levels of RH 5 to RH 15 – with directly proportional reductions in H2O2 concentration and germicidal efficacy.
To compound this error, a recent letter published in the Journal of Hospital Infection revealed that most of the tested efficacy of the Deprox process could be attributed to the exceptionally high silver nitrate content of the Deproxin solution – an illegal additive which Hygiene Solutions now claims to have removed.
What residual efficacy remains absent this powerful cytotoxin remains untested and unproven.
The shocking and highly persuasive statistics from the UCLH hospitals, showing a substantial upwards step change in C. difficile rates corresponding exactly with the years of Deprox use, cannot be denied. These are public data sets, and the 75 or so extra infections over this period demand explanation.
We need an inquiry in to the Deprox scandal NOW, while lives can still be saved – not in 30 years time.
A Freedom of Information request¹ to UCLH disclosed the starting and finishing dates of their disastrous Deprox decontamination contract with Hygiene Solutions Ltd. The Deprox operations started in June 2013 and ran continuously, 7 days per week through to October 2016. The contract called for at least 4 Deprox units to be at the hospital, and 6 or more processes to be completed daily.
However, due to frequent breakdowns, Hygiene Solutions struggled to meet their obligations, and on occasion asked engineers to put a non-functional Deprox unit in a room, tape up the door and “run” a process – thus not only defrauding the NHS but leaving a dangerously contaminated room that the staff believed to have been sterilized.
Plotting the contract dates against the quarterly UCLH C. difficile data² (extended through 2016 with mandatory government reporting data)³ reveals an exact correlation between the period of Deprox deployment and a substantial step change in the number of C.difficile infections – approximately 70 extra cases over the 29 month period.
According to the March 2016 government report on C. difficile mortality, the 30 day mortality rates for the London area were about 17%. – suggesting that approximately 12 deaths in this period could be attributed to Deprox operations. Any patients who acquired C. difficile or any other Heathcare Associated Infection, (HAI) in the UCLH hospitals between June 2013 and October 2015 should consider contacting a medical negligence solicitor and seeking compensation.
The CQC (Care Quality Commission) makes regular evaluations of NHS trusts using a list of critical indicators. These are the Intelligent Monitoring reports. The extracts from a series of these reports below show how the “Incidence of C. difficile” indicator moved from “No evidence of risk” to “Elevated Risk” when the Deprox program was implemented. The complete reports can be found at: http://www.cqc.org.uk/provider/RRV/reports
A change of editor presents opportunity for a fresh approach. The extraordinary extent of Hygiene Solutions’ unscrupulous activities, ranging from misleading puffery to complex and ingenious corruption of “independent” scientific testing, generates a challenging volume and variety of data to present.
To simplify this task, I have launched a new website, www.ultra-vfraud.info, to expose Hygiene Solutions’ egregious lies as to their new Ultra-V product, while www.deproxfraud.info will concentrate on the Deprox scandal, now entering its final phase as the HSE investigation nears completion.
A recent “Freedom of Information” request has yielded some extraordinary data on Deprox efficacy. This independently verifiable dataset demonstrates a 25% increase in C. dificile incidence in a major UK NHS trust, correlated exactly to a 28 month period of intensive Deprox use. This will be published here shortly.
The more the truth is tested and examined, the more firmly it stands. Lies, however credible at first glance, become shaky on close examination, and a determined investigation will reduce them to shreds and tatters. The mission of these websites is to present the facts, however unpalatable, about Hygiene Solutions Ltd, its criminally negligent directors and its dangerous and dishonestly promoted Deprox and Ultra-V products.
Judgement was pronounced on a £26,000 NHS fraud last week. The perpetrators only escaped jail as they had pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity and had repaid the money in full.
But Judge Adele Williams described it as a
She said further: –
What would the Judge have to say to the perpetrators of an £8,000,000 fraud against the NHS? Even if the directors of Hygiene Solutions were to refund the NHS for the tens of thousands of fraudulent Deprox processes they have done over the years, (see https://deproxfraud.info/2017/03/13/leaked-emails-prove-test-cheating-bodily-harm-and-massive-fraud/ ) would they escape jail?
Hygiene Solutions claim a single Deprox unit has the capacity to decontaminate rooms with a volume of 380m3, e.g. a 12 bed ward bay. A typical hospital side ward (single room with ensuite) has a volume of 60m3.
However, the chamber used by Hygiene Solutions Ltd to test the Deprox is 1.5m x 1.5m x 2.8m. Total volume 6.3m3 , just 10% of the volume of a hospital single bedroom, and 1.7% of the maximum volume that Deprox is guaranteed to disinfect. It is barely larger than a telephone box.
Hygiene Solutions internal testing, published here for the first time reveals that the Deprox, in spite of being boosted with 50% more concentrated hydrogen peroxide solution than the standard “Deproxin” was incapable of a log 6 decontamination of even this tiny test chamber.
The Deprox was thoroughly tested over a period of months by David Sempere Aracil, a well qualified chemist. David placed Log 6 biological indicator discs (Apex Biological Indicator #HMV-091) in 8 different locations around the inside walls of the test chamber. The Deprox unit (“Trusted by leading hospitals around the world”) was sealed in the chamber, and the process was run. The log6 BIs were incubated – they were all alive.
David tried substituting Sanosil SO15 which at 7.5% H2O2 is 50% more concentrated than Deproxin. Now some of the BIs would be sterilised, sometimes. Over several weeks in late 2014, David did a series of 12 tests in the test chamber, all with 7.5% H2O2 rather than the 5% Deproxin. He tried turning the ΔRH up and down, but to no avail. In 5 of these tests, all 8 BIs remained viable. None of the tests sterilised more than 6 out of 8.
In summary then:
Deprox, running on a 5% H2O2 solution, is claimed to give a log6 decontamination of an entire 380m3 ward, including inside small crevices and complex equipment. In Hygiene Solutions’ own tests, the Deprox running on a 7.5% solution, and thus generating a 50% higher aerial H2O2 concentration than the standard process, completely failed to give a log6 decontamination of a 6.3m3 box in multiple tests.
Hygiene Solutions continued to promote and sell the Deprox with exactly the same claims, but in 2015, they turned the whole Deprox fleet down from ΔRH20 to ΔRH5. See https://deproxfraud.info/2017/03/13/leaked-emails-prove-test-cheating-bodily-harm-and-massive-fraud/
Fortunately, (or unfortunately for Hygiene Solutions) David’s notes of these tests survived.
This table is a summary of 15 tests done by David Sempere Aracil, assisted by Tautvydas Karitonas, over a period of months. Both are university graduates with extensive research experience, and David has a PhD in Chemistry. The tests were done with a standard production model Deprox machine, the purpose of the tests was to determine if the extremely low efficacy of the Deprox process could be rectified by increasing the concentration of the hydrogen peroxide solution from the standard 5% to 7.5%.
The results were recorded in 3 A4 hardcover notebooks. Each of the 15 tests was recorded in more detail on preceding pages of the notebook. In addition to the efficacy tests, the notebooks contain extensive details of tests on prototype catalyst systems, and constitute proof that HS was well aware of both the low efficacy and residual gas issues with Deprox.
Heading: “Sanosil 015 forte” refers to Sanosil S015, which is a disinfectant intended for water systems. It is 7.5% Hydrogen peroxide solution. Note that this is more concentrated than the 5% Deproxin solution that is used in production Deprox machines.
Col.1. The test number. These are not sequential, as some tests did not use Biological indicators (BIs) and were not recorded in this resume.
Col. 2 Duration of test measured from when the machine starts vapourising. (It takes several minutes for the machine to fill the piezo tank at the beginning of each test)
Col. 3 Delta HR setting of machine. This is adjusted by using unmarked pressure sensitive switches below the LCD display. – see How to test your Deprox.
Col. 4 HRO This is the original relative humidity in the test chamber before the machine starts.
Col. 5 TO Temperature in the chamber before the machine starts
Col. 6 CMAX Hydrogen peroxide concentration in PPM, maximum level reached during process.
Results columns. The first 12 tests were done in the test chamber (wardrobe). Each number represents a specific marked location on the test chamber wall where an exposed stainless steel Bacillus subtilis log6 biological indicator was placed. The chamber is a crude wood and plasterboard structure in an essentially unheated warehouse. It is approximately 5’ x 5’ x 9’ and the indicators were placed at various heights on the interior walls of the chamber. The last 3 tests were done in the company board room which is approximately 12’ x 25’.
A” +” indicates that the BI still contained viable bacteria, a “–“ indicates that all bacteria on this indicator were killed.
Final column. This is the percentage of BIs that were killed.
The Yeovil Hospital Norovirus outbreak, first announced on April 3rd is now in its 21st day, and has spread from the initial 2 affected wards to a third..
Incredibly, the hospital decided to attempt to halt this highly contagious form of gastroenteritis WITHOUT using bleach or disinfectant, instead putting their trust in the Ultra-V device from Hygiene Solutions, which has never been tested on norovirus or any other type of virus before.
In fact, the only published study of Ultra-V shows that it has an efficacy of LESS THAN LOG 1. This test was done in the Wye Valley NHS Trust hospital in Hertford, and the sampling and incubation of the samples was carried out by Hygiene Solutions themselves.
To put that in context, ordinary household Dettol, as everyone knows, kills 99.9% of germs. The Ultra-V by the manufacturer’s own test results, kills less than 90%, and that is only where the UV light hits the surface directly. In the shadowed areas of the room it will be almost completely useless.
So in real terms, if a door handle was carrying 1000 norovirus germs, ordinary household Dettol would leave on average one germ alive. Ultra-V would leave more than 100 germs alive, and only if the light could somehow illuminate both sides of the handle at once.
Since 1865, when Joseph Lister introduced carbolic acid as a wound dressing, and operating theatre spray, countless millions or perhaps billions of lives have been saved by simple disinfectants, both in healthcare settings and by household disinfectants and chlorinated drinking water. There is probably no other single discovery that has done more to relieve human misery and suffering. 150 years of experience, scientific testing and advances in chemistry have produced an excellent range of effective, proven disinfectants, that are both inexpensive and can be applied by very simple spray and wipe methods.
Why then should all this be abandoned, at the worst possible moment, in favour of a hugely expensive, unproven device that by the manufacturer’s own published test results achieves only 100th of the effectiveness of ordinary Dettol?